tech debt isnt real and cant hurt you
On every team I’ve worked on, including at Amazon, engineers bring up “tech debt” as a concern. When I ask “what is tech debt” other engineers give me different responses, but all agree that product managers and line managers seemingly don’t understand or value “working on tech debt.” A term that’s this ubiquitous and means this much to engineers, yet seemingly so vague and ineffective as a term when prioritizing work, begs for some clarification. Here’s mine.
5 theses on tech debt
- Tech debt is the lack of technical confidence in the system this moment. That’s how engineers feel using this term.
- Lack of technical confidence (ignoring individual psychology because we start with trust for our peers), comes from a system being opaque and difficult to change and grow.
- A system is opaque and difficult to change when ambiguous or contradictory requirements were not or could not be reconciled, yielding complexity to manage competing trade-offs.
- You will never, ever work on a meaningful real-life system that does useful work with zero “technical debt.”
- Tech debt can be prevented and fixed: it’s under your control.
how to minimize tech debt
Tech debt has its commonly recognized symptoms: “ops” or high operational burden, bugs, slow velocity, kvetching. These things can be measured. An inexperienced manager will focus on minimizing these metrics, generally by focusing on slow velocity by “worrying” at their engineers excessively via progress tracking meetings. The manager’s confidence in the engineer is gone, the engineer’s confidence in themself leaves shortly thereafter (if it wasn’t already in peril); a death spiral ensues.
We want to detect and fix this earlier. What else can we observe, before we notice “tech debt?” Or, how can we increase the confidence of engineers when changing the system?
- You have bad product to market fit in the first place. If the product doesn’t have a strong fit, increasingly desperate and chaotic efforts to diversify the product to find a fit will be reflected directly in the code. This can really hurt to realize, because it means foundational parts of the business may be wrong. It may be unfixable.
- You have little to no “test coverage.” (Depending on your system, what a test is can look different, don’t be too literal about, say, unit tests.) Tests can be an overhead and I am not evangelical about them, but without them, the system is not exhaustively exercised except in its runtime environment where variable isolation is ~infinitely harder.
- You have high friction with build tools, so it’s hard to impossible for you to have a tight feedback loop. Making a tiny, incremental change to test your assumption takes 10 minutes to compile? You won’t do it. You’ll batch a set of assumptions together, and if it looks “fine” you’ll ship not realizing one of the dozen is a rotten egg.
- You have no metrics or don’t know how and why to read them. Your system should have a “cockpit” type view for you potentially at multiple levels and you should know all the profiling and analysis tools for your area. You should also have touchpoints to the BI (business intelligence) tools and preferably all these tools should produce data you can directly join on and visualize. Yes, EDA (exploratory data analysis) matters.
I would personally reject “make a big catch all Epic for all the ops issues,” “just document it better,” and “just spend more time on design” as “solutions” to tech debt. For the first, that’s called a garbage can and confidence will drop the more you see that can overflow. It’s an unbounded queue and will become infinite.
As for the other strategies, I value both practices highly and would make you do them if I could, but I don’t think they’re sufficiently mechanized to solve the root issue. Why? With documentation, as a mechanism it is almost never in sync with code, so it has an error rate first of translation and then, continuously, of drift. With design, the best designs are downstream of well defined requirements and the ability to test your assumptions, which are themselves downstream of tight feedback loops.
If I could give you one piece of advice to increase your technical confidence, it would simply be to minimize the friction of your feedback loop in testing your assumptions.